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Abstract
We generalize a theorem by Franc¸ois Fages that de-
scribes the relationship between the completion seman-
tics and the answer set semantics for logic programs
with negation as failure. The study of this relationship
is important in connection with the emergence of an-
swer set programming. Whenever the two semantics
are equivalent, answer sets can be computed by a sat-
isfiability solver, and the use of answer set solvers such
as smodels and dlv is unnecessary. A logic program-
ming representation of the blocks world due to Ilkka
Niemela¨ is discussed as an example.
Introduction
This note is about the relationship between the comple-
tion semantics (Clark 1978) and the answer set (“sta-
ble model”) semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991) for
logic programs with negation as failure. The study
of this relationship is important in connection with
the emergence of answer set programming (Marek
& Truszczyn´ski 1999; Niemela¨ 1999; Lifschitz 1999).
Whenever the two semantics are equivalent, answer sets
can be computed by a satisfiability solver, and the use
of “answer set solvers” such as smodels1 and dlv2 is
unnecessary.
Consider a finite propositional (or grounded) pro-
gram Π without classical negation, and a set X of
atoms. If X is an answer set for Π then X , viewed
as a truth assignment, satisfies the completion of Π.
The converse, generally, is not true. For instance, the
completion of
p← p (1)
is p ≡ p. This formula has two models ∅, {p}; the
first is an answer set for (1), but the second is not.
Franc¸ois Fages [1994] defined a syntactic condition on
logic programs that implies the equivalence between
the two semantics—“positive-order-consistency,” also
called “tightness” (Lifschitz 1996). What he requires
is the existence of a function λ from atoms to nonneg-
ative integers (or, more generally, ordinals) such that,
1http://saturn.hut.fi/pub/smodels/ .
2http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/ .
for every rule
A0 ← A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not An
in Π,
λ(A1), . . . , λ(Am) < λ(A0).
It is clear, for instance, that program (1) is not tight.
Fages proved that, for a tight program, every model of
its completion is an answer set. Thus, for tight pro-
grams, the completion semantics and the answer set
semantics are equivalent.
Our generalization of Fages’ theorem allows us to
draw similar conclusions for some programs that are
not tight. Here is one such program:
p← not q,
q ← not p,
p← p, r.
(2)
It is not tight. Nevertheless, each of the two models
{p}, {q} of its completion
p ≡ ¬q ∨ (p ∧ r),
q ≡ ¬p,
r ≡ ⊥
is an answer set for (2).
The idea of this generalization is to make function
λ partial. Instead of tight programs, we will consider
programs that are “tight on a set of literals.”
First we relate answer sets to a model-theoretic coun-
terpart of completion introduced in (Apt, Blair, &
Walker 1988), called supportedness. This allows us to
make the theorem applicable to programs with both
negation as failure and classical negation, and to pro-
grams with infinitely many rules.3 Then a corollary
about completion is derived, and applied to a logic pro-
gramming representation of the blocks world due to
Ilkka Niemela¨. We show how the satisfiability solver
sato (Zhang 1997) can be used to find answer sets for
that representation, and compare the performance of
smodels and sato on several benchmarks.
3The familiar definition of completion (see Appendix) is
applicable to finite programs only, unless we allow infinite
disjunctions in completion formulas.
Generalized Fages’ Theorem
We define a rule to be an expression of the form
Head ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln (3)
(n ≥ m ≥ 0) where each Li is a literal (propositional
atom possibly preceded by classical negation ¬), and
Head is a literal or the symbol ⊥. A rule (3) is called a
fact if n = 0, and a constraint if Head = ⊥. A program
is a set of rules. The familiar definitions of answer sets,
closed sets and supported sets for a program, as well
as the definition of the completion of a program, are
reproduced in the appendix.
Instead of “level mappings” used by Fages, we con-
sider here partial level mappings—partial functions
from literals to ordinals. A program Π is tight on a
set X of literals if there exists a partial level mapping
λ with the domain X such that, for every rule (3) in Π,
if Head , L1, . . . , Lm ∈ X then
λ(L1), . . . , λ(Lm) < λ(Head).
(For the constraints in Π this condition holds trivially,
because the head of a constraint is not a literal and thus
cannot belong to X .)
Theorem. For any program Π and any consistent set
X of literals such that Π is tight on X , X is an answer
set for Π iff X is closed under and supported by Π.
The proof below is almost unchanged from the proof
of Fages’ theorem given in (Lifschitz & Turner 1999,
Section 7.4).
Lemma. For any program Π without negation as fail-
ure and any consistent set X of literals such that Π is
tight on X , if X is closed under and supported by Π,
then X is an answer set for Π.
Proof: We need to show that X is minimal among the
sets closed under Π. Assume that it is not. Let Y be a
proper subset of X that is closed under Π, and let λ be
a partial level mapping establishing that Π is tight on
X . Take a literal L ∈ X \ Y such that λ(L) is minimal.
Since X is supported by Π, there is a rule
L← L1, . . . , Lm
in Π such that L1, . . . , Lm ∈ X . By the choice of λ,
λ(L1), . . . , λ(Lm) < λ(L).
By the choice of L, we can conclude that
L1, . . . , Lm ∈ Y.
Consequently Y is not closed under Π, contrary to the
choice of Y .
Proof of the Theorem: Left-to-right, the proof is
straightforward. Right-to-left: assume that X is closed
under and supported by Π. Then X is closed under
and supported by ΠX . Since Π is tight on X , so is ΠX .
Hence, by the lemma, X is an answer set for ΠX , and
consequently an answer set for Π.
In the special case when Π is a finite program without
classical negation, a set of atoms satisfies the comple-
tion of Π iff it is closed under and supported by Π. We
conclude:
Corollary 1. For any finite program Π without clas-
sical negation and any set X of atoms such that Π is
tight on X , X is an answer set for Π iff X satisfies the
completion of Π.
For instance, program (2) is tight on the model {p}
of its completion: take λ(p) = 0. By Corollary 1, it
follows that {p} is an answer set for (2). In a similar
way, the theorem shows that {q} is an answer set also.
By pos(Π) we denote the set of all literals that occur
without negation as failure at least once in the body of
a rule of Π.
Corollary 2. For any program Π and any consistent
set X of literals disjoint from pos(Π), X is an answer
set for Π iff X is closed under and supported by Π.
Corollary 3. For any finite program Π without clas-
sical negation and any set X of atoms disjoint from
pos(Π), X is an answer set for Π iff X satisfies the
completion of Π.
To derive Corollary 2 from the theorem, and Corol-
lary 3 from Corollary 1, take λ(L) = 0 for every L ∈ X .
Consider, for instance, the program
p← not q,
q ← not p,
r ← r,
p← r.
(4)
The completion of (4) is
p ≡ ¬q ∨ r,
q ≡ ¬p,
r ≡ r.
The models of these formulas are {p}, {q} and {p, r}.
The only literal occurring in the bodies of the rules
of (4) without negation as failure is r. In accordance
with Corollary 3, the models of the completion that
do not contain r—sets {p} and {q}—are answer sets
for (4).
Planning in the Blocks World
As a more interesting example, consider a logic pro-
gramming encoding of the blocks world due to Ilkka
Niemela¨. The main part of the encoding consists of the
following schematic rules:
goal :- time(T), goal(T).
:- not goal.
goal(T2) :- nextstate(T2,T1), goal(T1).
moveop(X,Y,T):-
time(T), block(X), object(Y), X != Y,
on_something(X,T), available(Y,T),
not covered(X,T), not covered(Y,T),
not blocked_move(X,Y,T).
on(X,Y,T2) :-
block(X), object(Y), nextstate(T2,T1),
moveop(X,Y,T1).
on_something(X,T) :-
block(X), object(Z), time(T), on(X,Z,T).
available(table,T) :- time(T).
available(X,T) :-
block(X), time(T), on_something(X,T).
covered(X,T) :-
block(Z), block(X), time(T), on(Z,X,T).
on(X,Y,T2) :-
nextstate(T2,T1), block(X), object(Y),
on(X,Y,T1), not moving(X,T1).
moving(X,T) :- time(T), block(X), object(Y),
moveop(X,Y,T).
blocked_move(X,Y,T):-
block(X), object(Y), time(T), goal(T).
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
time(T), block(X), object(Y),
not moveop(X,Y,T).
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
block(X), object(Y), object(Z), time(T),
moveop(X,Z,T), Y != Z.
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
block(X), object(Y), time(T), moving(Y,T).
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
block(X), block(Y), block(Z), time(T),
moveop(Z,Y,T), X != Z.
:- block(X), time(T), moveop(X,table,T),
on(X,table,T).
:- nextstate(T2,T1), block(X), object(Y),
moveop(X,Y,T1), moveop(X,table,T2).
nextstate(Y,X) :- time(X), time(Y),
Y = X + 1.
object(table).
object(X) :- block(X).
To solve a planning problem, we combine these rules
with
(i) a set of facts defining time/1 as an initial segment of
nonnegative integers, for instance
time(0). time(1). time(2).
(ii) a set of facts defining block/1, such as
block(a). block(b). block(c).
(iii) a set of facts encoding the initial state, such as
on(a,b,0). on(b,table,0).
(iv) a rule that encodes the goal, such as
goal(T) :- time(T), on(a,b,T), on(b,c,T).
The union is given as input to the “intelligent ground-
ing” program lparse, and the result of grounding is
passed on to smodels (Niemela¨ 1999, Section 7). The
answer sets for the program correspond to valid plans.
Concurrently executed actions are allowed in this for-
malization as long as their effects are not in conflict, so
that they can be arbitrarily interleaved.
The schematic rules above contain the variables T,
T1, T2, X, Y, Z that range over the object constants
occurring in the program, that is, over the nonnega-
tive integers that occur in the definition of time/1, the
names of blocks a, b,. . . that occur in the definition of
block/1, and the object constant table.
The expressions in the bodies of the schematic rules
that contain = and != restrict the constants that are
substituted for the variables in the process of grounding.
For instance, we understand the schematic rule
nextstate(Y,X) :- time(X), time(Y),
Y = X + 1.
as an abbreviation for the set of all ground instances of
nextstate(Y,X) :- time(X), time(Y).
in which X and Y are instantiated by a pair of consecu-
tive integers. The schematic rule
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
block(X), object(Y), object(Z), time(T),
moveop(X,Z,T), Y != Z.
stands for the set of all ground instances of
blocked_move(X,Y,T) :-
block(X), object(Y), object(Z), time(T),
moveop(X,Z,T).
in which Y and Z are instantiated by different object
constants.
According to this understanding of variables and
“built-in predicates,” Niemela¨’s schematic program, in-
cluding rules (i)–(iv), is an abbreviation for a finite pro-
gram BW in the sense defined above.
In the proposition below we assume that schematic
rule (iv) has the form
goal(T) :- time(T), ...
where the dots stand for a list of schematic atoms with
the predicate symbol on and the last argument T.
Proposition. Program BW is tight on each of the
models of its completion.
Lemma. For any atom of the form nextstate(Y,X)
that belongs to a model of the completion of pro-
gram BW , Y = X+ 1.
Proof: The completion of BW contains the formula
nextstate(Y, X)≡ false
for all Y, X such that Y 6= X+ 1.
Proof of the Proposition. Let X be an answer set
for BW . By Tmax we denote the largest argument of
time/1 in its definition (i). Consider the partial level
mapping λ with domain X defined as follows:
λ(time(T)) = 0,
λ(block(X)) = 0,
λ(object(X)) = 1,
λ(nextstate(Y, X)) = 1,
λ(covered(X, T)) = 4 · T+ 3,
λ(on something(X, T)) = 4 · T+ 3,
λ(available(X, T)) = 4 · T+ 4,
λ(moveop(X, Y, T)) = 4 · T+ 5,
λ(on(X, Y, T)) = 4 · T+ 2,
λ(moving(X, T)) = 4 · T+ 6,
λ(goal(T)) = 4 · T+ 3,
λ(blocked move(X, Y, T)) = 4 · T + 7,
λ(goal) = 4 · Tmax + 4.
This level mapping satisfies the inequality from the def-
inition of a tight program for every rule of BW ; the
lemma above allows us to verify this assertion for the
rules containing nextstate in the body.
According to Corollary 1, we can conclude that the
answer sets for program BW can be equivalently char-
acterized as the models of the completion of BW .
Answer Set Programming
with CCALC and SATO
The equivalence of the completion semantics to the an-
swer set semantics for program BW shows that it is not
necessary to use an answer set solver, such as smodels,
to compute answer sets for BW ; a satisfiability solver
can be used instead. Planning by giving the completion
of BW as input to a satisfiability solver is a form of an-
swer set programming and, at the same time, a special
case of satisfiability planning (Kautz & Selman 1992).
The Causal Calculator, or ccalc4, is a system that
is capable, among other things, of grounding and com-
pleting a schematic logic program, clausifying the com-
pletion, and calling a satisfiability solver (for instance,
sato) to find a model. We have conducted a series of
experiments aimed at comparing the run times of sato,
when its input is generated from BW by ccalc, with
the run times of smodels, when its input is generated
from BW by lparse.
Because the built-in arithmetic of ccalc is somewhat
different from that of lparse, we had to modify BW
4http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/ccalc/ .
Problem Blocks Steps Run time Run time
of of
smodels sato
large.c 15 7 9.86 1.82
8 31.25 2.16
large.d 17 8 18.25 2.96
9 62.48 4.14
large.e 19 9 27.31 5.40
10 101.4 7.16
Figure 1: Planning with BW : sato vs. smodels
slightly. Our ccalc input file uses variables of sorts
object, block and time instead of the unary predicates
with these names. The rules of BW that contain those
predicates in their bodies are modified accordingly. For
instance, rule
on_something(X,T) :-
block(X), object(Z), time(T), on(X,Z,T).
turns into
on_something(B1,T) :- on(B1,O2,T).
The macro expansion facility of ccalc expands
nextstate(T2,T1)
into the expression
T2 is T1 + 1
that contains Prolog’s built-in is.
Figure 1 shows the run times of smodels (Version
2.24 and sato (Version 3.1.2) in seconds, measured
using the Unix time command, on the benchmarks
from (Niemela¨ 1999, Section 9, Table 3). For each prob-
lem, one of the two entries corresponds to the largest
number of steps for which the problem is not solvable,
and the other to the smallest number of steps for which
a solution exists. The experiments were performed on
an UltraSPARC with 124 MB main memory and a 167
MHz CPU.
The numbers in Figure 1 are “search times”—the
grounding and completion times are not included. The
computation involved in grounding and completion
does not depend on the initial state or the goal of the
planning problem and, in this sense, can be viewed
as “preprocessing.” lparse performs grounding more
efficiently than ccalc, partly because the former is
written in C++ and the latter in Prolog. The last
benchmark in Figure 1 was grounded by lparse (Ver-
sion 0.99.41) in 16 seconds; ccalc (Version 1.23) spent
50 seconds in grounding and about the same amount
of time forming the completion. But the size of the
grounded program is approximately the same in both
cases: lparse generated 191621 rules containing 13422
atoms, and ccalc generated 200661 rules containing
13410 atoms.
Discussion
Fages’ theorem, and its generalization proved in this
note, allow us to compute answer sets for some pro-
grams by completing them and then calling a satisfiabil-
ity solver. We showed that this method can be applied,
for instance, to the representation of the blocks world
proposed in (Niemela¨ 1999). This example shows that
satisfiability solvers may serve as useful computational
tools in answer set programming.
There are cases, on the other hand, when the com-
pletion method is not applicable. Consider comput-
ing Hamiltonian cycles in a directed graph (Marek &
Truszczyn´ski 1999). We combine the rules
in(U,V) :- edge(U,V), not out(U,V).
out(U,V) :- edge(U,V), not in(U,V).
:- in(U,V), in(U,W), V != W.
:- in(U,W), in(V,W), U != V.
reachable(V) :- in(v0,V).
reachable(V) :- reachable(U), in(U,V).
:- vertex(U), not reachable(U).
with a set of facts defining the vertices and edges of the
graph; v0 is assumed to be one of the vertices. The
answer sets for the resulting program correspond to
the Hamiltonian cycles. Generally, the completion of
the program has models different from its answer sets.
Take, for instance, the graph consisting of two disjoint
loops:
vertex(v0). vertex(v1).
edge(v0,v0). edge(v1,v1).
This graph has no Hamiltonian cycles, and, accordingly,
the corresponding program has no answer sets. But the
set
vertex(v0), vertex(v1), edge(v0,v0),
edge(v1,v1), in(v0,v0), in(v1,v1),
reachable(v0), reachable(v1)
is a model of the program’s completion.
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Appendix: Definitions
The notion of an answer set is defined first for programs
whose rules do not contain negation as failure. Let Π
be such a program, and let X be a consistent set of
literals. We say that X is closed under Π if, for every
rule
Head ← Body
in Π, Head ∈ X whenever Body ⊆ X . (For a constraint,
this condition means that the body is not contained
in X .) We say that X is an answer set for Π if X
is minimal among the sets closed under Π w.r.t. set
inclusion. It is clear that a program without negation
as failure can have at most one answer set.
To extend this definition to arbitrary programs, take
any program Π, and let X be a consistent set of literals.
The reduct ΠX of Π relative to X is the set of rules
Head ← L1, . . . , Lm
for all rules (3) in Π such that Lm+1, . . . , Ln 6∈ X . Thus
ΠX is a program without negation as failure. We say
that X is an answer set for Π if X is an answer set
for ΠX .
A set X of literals is closed under Π if, for ev-
ery rule (3) in Π, Head ∈ X whenever L1, . . . , Lm ∈ X
and Lm+1, . . . , Ln 6∈ X . We say that X is sup-
ported by Π if, for every L ∈ X, there is a rule (3)
in Π such that Head = L, L1, . . . , Lm ∈ X and
Lm+1, . . . , Ln 6∈ X .
Let Π be a finite program without classical negation.
If H is an atom or the symbol ⊥, by Comp(Π, H) we
denote the formula
H ≡
∨
(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An)
where the disjunction extends over all rules
H ← A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not An
in Π with the head H . The completion of Π is set of
formulas Comp(Π, H) for all H .
